The term "informational integrity" is - as far as can be seen - not yet established in legislation and jurisprudence. Its proponents draw an analogy between the physical integrity of the individual and the integrity of the individual with all his or her informational references. In the digital age, the sum of the information available about each individual has reached an extent that is more than the parts to be considered individually. In the overall view all these informational references correspond to our analogue physical existence. Accordingly, the fundamental right to data protection could be understood as a right of defence against encroachments on this informational integrity of the individual. Just as the integrity of the human (analogue) body is a prerequisite for the exercise of all rights and freedoms (freedom of assembly, freedom of action, etc), informational integrity could be seen as a prerequisite for participation in (digital) life. In this context, processing personal data would be only permissible if justified by a legal provision. The idea of data ownership would have to be rejected analogously to the human body.